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1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to reconsider, in the light of global developments 
and other challenges, attempts over the past four decades to agree principles and 
rules of international law relating to the establishment and operation of a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO). For its critics, the NIEO was a one-sided 
attempt, based on unsound legal and economic principles, to undermine the 
integrity of the global economic system, a system that had played a vital role in 
permitting the world to recover following the tragedy of the Second World War. 
For its proponents, it was, on the other hand, a life-and-death attempt to reorder 
a system that was perpetually and unfairly biased against the poor majority; 
‘life-and-death’ because the poverty that results from lack of development was 
not (nor continues to be) an abstract issue. 
In particular, in seeking to narrow the fi eld of enquiry, this article will review 
the attempt by the non-governmental International Law Association (ILA)1 
– acting through its international committee on the topic – to forge a clearer 
North-South consensus on this matter through the adoption of its 1986 Seoul 
Declaration on Progressive Development of Principles of Public International 
Law relating to a New International Economic Order.2 In consciously trying 
to overcome some of the more overt political divisions within the UN General 
Assembly, the ILA sought to fi nd carefully crafted compromises on such topics 
as permanent sovereignty over natural resources, specifi cally expropriation, the 
right to development, common heritage of mankind, as well as on broader issues 
of equality, equity and economic solidarity. Now, over twenty years after Seoul, 
it is fi tting to consider whether the 1986 Declaration, in trying to move the 
debate forward, ultimately proved little more than a symbolic, but largely futile, 
gesture.3 Was this legal desiratum just too idealistic and utopian, particularly in 
the light of changing global circumstances and political realities?
 In reviewing both the content of the Seoul Declaration itself and develop-
ments subsequent to it, the article suggests that while some might seek to argue 
that the Declaration is now somewhat dated and out-of-step with the current 
situation, the underlying premise on which it was built nevertheless remains 
extremely apposite. Moreover, the continued failure by states to implement and/
1.  As its own literature reads, ‘[t]he International Law Association was founded in Brussels 
in 1873. Its objectives, under its Constitution, are “the study, clarifi cation and development of in-
ternational law, both public and private, and the furtherance of international understanding and re-
spect for international law”. The ILA has consultative status, as an international non-governmental 
organisation, with a number of the United Nations specialised agencies.’
2.  To be found in ILA, Report of the Sixty-Second Conference (Seoul, 1986) (London, ILA 
1987) pp. 1-11.
3.  This is not the fi rst attempt to revisit, and review, the role and relevance of the 1986 Seoul 
Declaration; specifi c mention should be made of P. VerLoren van Themaat, ‘Ten Years after the 
Seoul Declaration’, in E. Denters and N. Schrijver, eds., Refl ections on International Law from the 
Low Countries in Honour of Paul de Waart (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff 1998) pp. 13-26.
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or respect a number of the key principles in the Declaration should be taken 
less as evidence of their obsoleteness and more of the continuing inequality 
within the present system, a level of inequality that remains as detrimental to 
the promotion of a balanced global order as it ever did. 
 Nevertheless, things have changed and issues have moved on. The rise of 
globalization, liberalization and privatization, the growth of non-state actors 
(both multinational enterprises and non-governmental organisations), the adop-
tion of signifi cantly more intrusive trade and investment regimes, and the 
continued rise – both in popular and political currency – of societal concerns 
(e.g., environmental issues, human rights, labour standards and good gover-
nance) are amongst a range of phenomena that must inevitably affect any 
current discussion. Signifi cantly, one of the factors that must now be considered 
especially relevant in a reappraisal of the NIEO is the global endorsement of 
the notion of sustainable development; this attempt to bring together economic 
development, social progress and environmental protection in a unifi ed and 
holistic manner refl ects a more balanced approach to issues previously consid-
ered purely from an economic standpoint. This was clearly the view of the ILA 
which, at its New Delhi conference in 2002, adopted the Declaration of Princi-
ples of International Law relating to Sustainable Development, using the Seoul 
Declaration as a conceptual basis from which these newer issues could be taken 
forward.4
 In conclusion, though it is accepted that the more extreme – and partisan 
– versions of the NIEO must now be considered as consigned to legal and 
economic history, there is arguably a suffi cient remnant of purpose within the 
NIEO ideal to continue to justify pursuing its underlying aims. And it is in 
that regard that, as an attempt to achieve a broad consensus of opinion across a 
range of geo-political and legal jurisdictions, the 1986 Seoul Declaration must 
be considered a pivotal starting point. Moreover, it should not be considered 
a criticism that its objectives are invariably longer-term in nature. What the 
ILA text does is to provide useful pointers towards the achievement of a goal, 
which is foundational to the functioning of a fairer international community, 
and which has arguably become even more urgent since 1986. 
4.  ILA, Report of the Seventieth Conference (New Delhi, 2002) (London, ILA 2002) pp. 23-29 
(also submitted by the governments of The Netherlands and Bangladesh to the 2002 World Sum-
mit on Sustainable Development as UN doc. A/57/329) and in 49 NILR (2002) p. 299. On the legal 
implications of sustainable development, see D. French, International Law and Policy of Sustain-
able Development (Manchester, Manchester University Press 2005).
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2. NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: A SUMMARY 
 AND RETROSPECTIVE
Despite much that is well-known about the development of the South as a 
collective politico-legal entity5 and, more specifi cally, its claim for the estab-
lishment of the NIEO,6 it may nevertheless prove useful to provide a relatively 
brief review, both because of its undoubted importance in its own right for 
what it says about the legal and geo-political relations between North and 
South but also, within the context of this article, because it inevitably acts as 
a signifi cant precursor to any examination of the 1986 Seoul Declaration, for 
which it provided both its background and its motivation. For many, however, 
talking about the NIEO, as enshrined in such documents as the 1974 Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States, seems like talking about a bygone 
world; the sheer number of global economic events that have occurred since 
1974 (depressions, up-turns, debt crises, monetarism, regionalism, the advent 
of globalization, etc.) merely highlighting the length of time that has past since 
those highly divisive issues were fi rst discussed. 
 Nevertheless, and when viewed from a historical perspective especially, 
arguments over the nature of the economic system were inevitable as it should 
have been obvious to all that legal independence, by itself, would do very little 
to improve developing states’ political and socio-economic position. As Anand 
notes, ‘[a] large majority of the new world community … [were] poor, weak, 
underdeveloped’.7 Developing states were simply not prepared to accept the 
economic status quo, just as they had not been prepared to accept the colo-
nial system. Issues such as the unfavourable terms of international trade, the 
operation of the international monetary and fi nancial systems, participation in 
international economic institutions and, especially, sovereign control over a 
state’s own territory became exceedingly high priorities for such countries. As 
was said at the time, ‘[i]t is being increasingly felt that the affl uent sector of the 
world “cannot remain a quiet island in the midst of a stormy ocean, an oasis 
5.  For instance, see W. Verwey, ‘The United Nations and the Least Developed Countries: An 
Exploration in the Grey Zones of International Law’, in J. Macarczyk, ed., Essays in International 
Law in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff 1984) p. 531 and G. Ver-
dirame, ‘The Defi nition of Developing Countries under GATT and other International Law’, 
39 GYIL (1997) p. 164.
6.  See, for instance, K. Hossain, ed., Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Or-
der (London, Francis Pinter 1980), R. Anand, Confrontation or Cooperation? International Law 
and Developing Countries (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff 1987) and, for a more recent discussion of 
many of the issues that still galvanise the South, see L. Boisson de Chazournes and V. Gowlland-
Debbas, eds., The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality (The Hague, 
Martinus Nijhoff 2001).
7.  Anand, supra n. 6, at p. 44.
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of prosperity in a desert of desperate poverty”’.8 Economic self-determination, 
therefore, became as urgent a political necessity as the achievement of sover-
eign independence.
 One of the earliest moves by the South at the international level was to ensure 
international recognition of the principle that each state has permanent sover-
eignty over its own natural resources. In 1962, the General Assembly adopted 
a landmark resolution endorsing such a principle, noting that such permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources was to be exercised so as to be in the interest 
of a state’s ‘national development and of the well-being of the people of the 
State’.9 In itself, this resolution was only a small step towards achieving the 
aims of the South; nevertheless, it was highly symbolic as it emphasized the 
fact that developing countries were prepared to utilize fully their rights under 
classical international law to sovereign equality and independence. However, 
despite this early restatement of a clearly foundational legal principle – admit-
tedly in a then modern guise – developing countries continued to collectively 
demand more. Following on from a special session of the General Assembly in 
1974, which resulted in a Declaration on the Establishment of a New Interna-
tional Economic Order and a Programme of Action;10 the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) was subsequently adopted by the General 
Assembly in normal session, later in 1974.11 
 CERDS envisaged the creation of a new economic order that was premised 
upon a revised normative structure for international economic relations based 
both on a number of general rules of public international law and guided by 
several over-aching principles. These principles included both seemingly 
non-contentious elements (i.e., respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and political independence of states, acceptance of the sovereign equality of 
all states and an acknowledgement of principles such as non-intervention and 
fulfi lment in good faith of international obligations) and, equally apparent, more 
contentious elements (i.e., ‘mutual and equitable benefi t’, ‘no attempt to seek 
hegemony and spheres of infl uence’ and the ‘promotion of international social 
justice’). By far and away the most divisive of issues were the rules relating 
to, and the level of compensation to be paid for, expropriation. While the 1962 
resolution on permanent sovereignty had secured consensus and was gener-
ally seen as acceptable by most (on this and other issues), the revisions in 
8.  Ibid., at p. 106. The quotation is taken from a speech by the then President of the Gambia, 
President Jawara (UN Doc. A/PV. 2211, pp. 17-20 (11th April 1974)).
9.  Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (UNGA Res. 1803 (XVII) 
(1962)) para. 1. See generally, N. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights 
and Duties (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1997).
10.  Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
UNGA Doc. A/RES/3202 (S-VI) (1974).
11.  UNGA Res. 3281 (XXIX) (1974). Ultimately, CERDS controversial text meant that it was 
not adopted by consensus, but by a majority vote. 120 States voted in favour, 6 against and 10 ab-
stained. 
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CERDS were viewed – by the North – as completely without foundation and 
wholly one-sided. With no reference to the need for an overriding ground of 
‘public purpose, security or the national interest’ to legitimize the expropriation 
and with no reference to international law either in relation to the obligation 
to make appropriate compensation or as regards dispute settlement the view 
quickly formed in developed states that CERDS was not only not refl ective of 
customary international law, but it refl ected an economic – and short-termist – 
militancy on the part of the South.
 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the fi nal position of developed states was fi rmly 
against the wholesale adoption of this new economic platform. Moreover, even 
considered and more balanced voices within the North, viewed this attempt 
to use numerical superiority as a means of coercing change with a great deal 
of regret. In particular, many international lawyers from developed countries 
viewed with suspicion the attempt to develop a new international normative 
framework in such a combative atmosphere. As Stephen Schwebel commented,
‘I see those documents as very mixed, containing progressive elements, but regres-
sive elements as well. The resolutions of the NIEO were forced through the General 
Assembly in a lamentable atmosphere. They were not negotiated solutions but a par-
tisan set of demands … As for the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 
it is not international law, and happily so, for in some respects it is sound, but in 
other respects, quite nationalistic and unsound.’12
Ultimately, the NIEO suffered not only for appearing partisan but also for being 
overly-radical. CERDS became to be seen not only as pro-South, but as anti-
free trade. There was a feeling that, however worded, the NIEO was, as noted 
above, ‘nationalistic and [economically] unsound’. There was also a somewhat 
exaggerated fear that the NIEO would ultimately require a socialistic redis-
tribution of wealth.13 Developed states also noted that the NIEO had little to 
say about intra-state redistribution; there was a genuine concern that economic 
restructuring would merely benefi t the elites in developing countries, that the 
living standards of the majority of the population would remain unchanged. 
The claims of developing states might be genuine, but for developed states, the 
simplistic solutions were not as ‘easy’ as those proposed in such documents as 
CERDS. 
 One way for the North to undermine the NIEO was to deny it any form of 
legal status. And whilst some of its supporters were talking in terms of a ‘new 
12.  S. Schwebel, ‘A Commentary’, in T.M.C. Asser Institute, ed., International Law and the 
Grotian Heritage (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Institute 1985) p. 142. 
13.  See R. Meagher, International Redistribution of Wealth and Power: A Study of the Char-
ter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (New York, NY, Pergamon Press 1979).
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branch of international law’ – an ‘international law of development’14 – critics 
argued that any action taken by developed states towards assisting developing 
states was purely voluntary and that the rules contained within such declara-
tions as CERDS ‘had not yet crossed the threshold of lex lata’.15 By arguing 
that CERDS was not representative of customary international law, developed 
states were able to control the nature and extent of the reform of the economic 
system. The effect of this was to ensure that the NIEO became little more than 
an aspiration, and CERDS little more than a series of platitudes. 
 This lack of enthusiasm for economic reform coincided with a general 
reversal in the social and economic situation of many states, particularly at the 
end of the 1970s and the early 1980s. Thus, the NIEO as a wholesale movement 
of change was dead. However, despite a general failure to implement the NIEO, 
there were nevertheless subsequent developments which, at least, appeared to 
recognise more explicitly the needs and situation of developing countries, such 
as the GATT’s 1979 Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries,16 the conclu-
sion of international commodity agreements,17 the failed attempts to negotiate 
international codes of conduct for transnational corporations18 and technology 
transfer,19 and the increasing reference to the interests of developing countries 
in multilateral conventions, arguably most conspicuously in the negotiation and 
conclusion of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.
 Another effort by developing states to force through change was the adop-
tion by the General Assembly in 1986 of the UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development (UNDRD).20 The purpose of UNDRD was to bring the develop-
ment debate within human rights law.21 As Article 1 of the Declaration states, 
‘[t]he right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which 
14.  For a general introduction, see D. Bradlow, ‘Development Decision-Making and the Con-
tent of International Development Law’, 27 Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review (2004) p. 195.
15.  G. Abi-Saab, ‘Whither the International Community?’, 9 EJIL (1998) pp. 263-265.
16.  BISD 25th Suppl. (1980) p. 203. A more recent example of the requirement to take into 
account the concerns of developing states is Art. XI.2 1993 WTO Agreement which states, ‘[t]he 
least developed countries recognized as such by the United Nations will only be required to un-
dertake commitments and concessions to the extent consistent with their individual development, 
fi nancial and trade needs or their administrative and institutional capabilities’.
17.  As World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 1987) p. 81, notes ‘[they] have not been easy to negotiate, and 
regulation of commodity trade has been notoriously controversial and diffi cult’, having already 
noted that ‘real progress has been very limited and in fact there have been reversals’. 
18.  See Meagher, supra n. 13.
19.  See P. Roffe, ‘UNCTAD: Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology – Sixth Session of 
the UN Conference’, 19 Journal of World Trade Law (1985) p. 669.
20.  UNGA Res. 41/128 (1986).
21.  See generally S. Chowdhury, et al., eds., The Right to Development in International Law 
(Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff 1992).
boek_NILR2008-1.indb   9 25-4-2008   10:03:10
D. FRENCH10 NILR 2008
every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute 
to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized’. However, 
despite attempts in the Declaration to shift the focus away from the right of 
developing states to the rights of the individual and peoples, many developed 
states continued to argue that UNDRD was merely a vehicle for re-introducing 
the NIEO, as well as diverting attention away from the protection of more 
traditional human rights, such as freedom from torture and death. In particular, 
UNDRD’s insistence on ‘effective international co-operation’, and the provision 
of ‘appropriate means and facilities’22 to implement such cooperation, merely 
added to the concern of developed countries that this was just another attempt 
by developing states to establish a general customary obligation to cooperate. 
 So what interim conclusions can one draw from what undoubtedly is one 
of the most interesting periods of diplomatic and legal global politicking since 
1945? If implemented, its supporters hoped, the NIEO would have ensured a 
very different international economic community from the one then in opera-
tion, one where the interests of the weakest would be of concern to the policies 
of the strongest.23 In particular, and contrary to the view of developed states, 
many in the NIEO movement felt that international economic relations should 
not be left to an unfettered free market,24 but should be recognised as a powerful 
tool by which the international community could redress imbalances in the 
present system. As Baxi notes, ‘the basic impulse of the NIEO, its objectives 
and strategies, point to a restructuring of North-South relations in such a funda-
mental manner as to reduce dominance and dependence which characterized 
[previous] relations’.25 On the other hand, the view of the North has remained 
very clear that the South, in trying to use its numerical strength, brought 
forward a number of ill-conceived proposals which would have jeopardised 
the operational integrity of the global economic system as a whole. Thus, many 
in the North have always been critical of the NIEO project as a whole, both in 
terms of the process relied upon and as regards some of the more contentious 
aspects of its content. What both sides can probably agree on is that the North 
very consciously – and arguably very successfully – negated giving the NIEO 
defi nitive normative status. As noted above, in circumscribing its legal status, 
developed states, in effect, ensured control over its (non-)implementation. For 
22.  Art. 4.2 UNDRD.
23.  Abi-Saab, supra n. 15, at p. 263: ‘[NIEO] postulates as its basis the common interest of all 
states in the development of the weakest and most vulnerable.’
24.  Ibid., at p. 265. He argues that the ‘invisible hand’ or ‘supreme law’ of the market means 
that economic decision-making is left to ‘naked power relations in society, in the pure tradition of 
social Darwinism’.
25.  U. Baxi, ‘The New International Economic Order, Basic Needs and Rights’, 23 Indian JIL 
(1983) p. 225.
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the North, this was to be seen as a very positive outcome; for the South, on the 
other hand, this was something to be very much regretted. 
3. THE 1986 ILA SEOUL DECLARATION: REAL MOVEMENT,  
 CONSENSUAL PROGRESS?
It was in this politically divided atmosphere that the ILA decided in the late 
1970s to establish an international committee to research further into the legal 
issues surrounding the topic. The committee – made up of primarily legal 
academics from both developed and developing countries, chaired by Kamal 
Hossain of Bangladesh – considered the whole gamut of issues associated 
with the international economic system and developing countries’ demands 
for change. The committee worked primarily through its four sub-committees; 
on general principles and CERDS (sub-committee I), permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources, economic activities and wealth (sub-committee II), 
transnational corporations, transfer of technology, restrictive business prac-
tices and participation of developing countries in the multilateral trading system 
(sub-committee III) and, latterly, monetary and fi nancial matters relating to 
development (sub-committee IV). 
 After a number of initial reports, and greatly assisted by a questionnaire 
disseminated by the committee’s Rapporteur-General Professor Milan Bulaji  
(Yugoslavia) as well as a further questionnaire drafted by Professor Schachter 
(United States), the committee decided at a meeting in Belgrade in 1985 to 
aim to draw up a draft declaration of basic legal principles in time for the next 
ILA conference a year later. As the committee’s 1986 (fourth) report notes, 
‘[c]onsensus was reached at the Belgrade meeting … that the draft declara-
tion should have a similar character to the 1970 United Nations Declaration 
of Principles of International Law … and that it should aim at overcoming the 
controversies which appeared in 1974 … by listing a relatively small number 
of principles of international law relating to a NIEO on which consensus can 
be reached’.26 After a period of intense discussion and consultation, a draft text 
was ready for consideration which, after numerous last minute and substantive 
changes to the text, was adopted at the biennial ILA conference in Seoul in 
1986. 
 The fi nal version of the Seoul Declaration is structurally divided into three 
parts; a preamble, a specifi c part (which lists 11 of the 12 principles) and a 
general part (which sets out a rule of interpretation,27 a ‘without prejudice’ 
clause to the UN Charter, a restatement of the importance of the peaceful settle-
26.  ILA, supra n. 2, at p. 425.
27.  Para. 12: ‘In their interpretation and application the above principles are inter-related and 
each principle should be construed in the context of the other principles.’
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ment of disputes (the twelfth principle) and an ‘appeal’ to states to be ‘guided 
by the principles embodied’ therein). Before considering the principles them-
selves, it is worth making three introductory points. First, as the preamble to the 
Declaration makes clear, the principles listed are not intended to be exhaustive, 
rather they are ‘a selection of the most important of such principles on which a 
consensus can be expected’. This immediately imports a strong note of realism 
into any discussion; though the ILA, through its work, hoped to move beyond 
some of the diffi culties faced in previous intergovernmental attempts on these 
matters, the Seoul Declaration would not provide – nor was intended to be – an 
all-encompassing panacea. Success for the Seoul Declaration was always to be 
limited by its own recognition of the real politic. Nevertheless, as a counter-
balance, one should also note VerLoren van Themaat’s comment that ‘[f]rom 
a doctrinal point of view the Declaration indeed contributed to overcoming the 
stagnation in the North-South global negotiations in at least some important 
areas’.28
 Second, the Declaration very consciously included both principles it argues 
are lex lata and those principles which were still evolving. Though some ques-
tioned whether the correct balance was achieved in assigning the appropriate 
normative status to the principles included, nevertheless those who took the lead 
in drafting the text genuinely sought to highlight this difference between the 
principles. On this basis, the reference to ‘progressive development’ in the title 
of the Declaration is clearly intentional. Of course, even legally binding princi-
ples rarely operate as meaningfully and as comprehensively as they should, and 
thus are often as much in need of reinforcement as those principles that are still 
de lege ferenda. As the preamble makes clear, ‘[c]onsidering the affi rmation and 
where appropriate further refi nement of the following principles would secure 
their more effective application in the interest of the international community 
and promote the realization of the purposes of the United Nations’.29 
 Third, it may be appropriate at this point to note that the preparation of the 
Seoul Declaration was not a misguided – and overtly political – endeavour for 
the ILA, but was, in fact, an integral part of the role the organisation considers 
it should play in international affairs. As one speaker at Seoul noted,
‘[o]ur subject … is one of the most important and delicate undertakings in the his-
tory of the ILA … The members of the International Committee … have been very 
conscious of their role and responsibilities … Because of the bifurcation of the world 
into developed States and developing States, our task has not been easy … the Com-
mittee’s draft Declaration represents a substantial improvement over the text of the 
[1974] Charter.’30
28.  VerLoren van Themaat, supra n. 3, at pp. 14-15.
29.  Emphasis added.
30.  ILA, supra n. 2, at pp. 474-475. Though the summary report does name individual speak-
ers, and thus does not follow Chatham Rules in this regard, I felt it was unnecessary to attribute 
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3.1 The Seoul principles – a step forward?
As noted above, the specifi c part of the Seoul Declaration contains eleven of the 
twelve principles; the twelfth concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes is 
incorporated in the general part. The other eleven principles are:
1) the rule of public international law in international economic relations;
2) pacta sunt servanda;
3) the principles of equity and solidarity and the entitlement to develop-
ment assistance;
4) the duty to co-operate for global development;
5) permanent sovereignty over natural resources, economic activities and 
wealth;
6) the right to development;
7) the principle of common heritage of mankind;
8) the principle of equality or non-discrimination;
9) participatory equality of developing countries in international economic 
relations;
10) principles of substantive equality, including the preferential and non-
reciprocal treatment of developing countries in international economic 
relations;
11) the right of every state to benefi t from science and technology.
Though it is beyond the scope of this article to outline each principle in turn 
in any detail, it will undoubtedly be worthwhile to highlight certain key prin-
ciples, especially those which were considered foundational to the securing of 
consensus over the text of the Declaration, and thus seen as an advance on the 
political divisions evident during the General Assembly debates on CERDS. Three 
principles were particularly contentious; permanent sovereignty, right to devel-
opment and common heritage of mankind. Compromise was only found on these 
issues very late during the Seoul conference itself, with many signifi cant differences 
being evident between the drafts presented at the outset of the conference and the 
fi nal text. This article will briefl y say something on the fi rst two.31
 Out of all the principles, the principle of permanent sovereignty (principle 5) 
was undoubtedly the most diffi cult to resolve. The principle – as set out in the 
fi nal Declaration – contains a number of key elements, including that it expressly 
extends national jurisdiction not only over natural resources but also to economic 
activities and wealth, that it emanates from the principle of self-determination and 
these quotations, as it does not add to – and may, in fact, divert attention away from – the weight 
of what is being said.
31.  As regards common heritage of mankind, the principal issue was the extent to which it 
only became binding and operational once located within a treaty regime, thus negating autono-
mous customary status – this being the approach the Seoul Declaration fi nally took.
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that it empowers a state ‘to regulate, exercise authority, legislate and impose taxes 
in respect of natural resources enjoyed and economic activities exercised and wealth 
held in their own territories by foreign interests subject only to any applicable 
requirements of international law’.32 Unsurprisingly, the most divisive issue under 
this broad banner of permanent sovereignty was the matter of expropriation. The 
original draft had left in much that was still contentious; in particular, some felt 
that it failed to refl ect adequately current law, departing from ‘the jurisprudence 
of competent international tribunals, agreements between and among States and 
pronouncements of international organisations’.33 Conversely, others argued that 
it took ‘State practice and commercial practice duly into account’.34 In the fi nal 
version, the Declaration was signifi cantly more concise than the draft, resolving 
– or, perhaps more accurately, not discussing – some of the most diffi cult issues. In 
its adopted version, it read: 
‘5.5 A State may nationalise, expropriate, exercise eminent domain over or otherwise 
transfer property or rights in property within its territory and jurisdiction subject to 
the principle of international law requiring a public purpose and non-discrimination, 
to appropriate compensation as required by international law, and to any applicable 
treaty, and without prejudice to legal effects flowing from any contractual undertak-
ing.’
In the fi nal version, much was changed; out went a presumption against resti-
tution in integrum, a discussion of a state’s sovereign right to revise or adjust 
an agreement, the attempt to defi ne appropriate compensation, and an elabora-
tion of the role of dispute settlement in this area, and in came a requirement of 
non-discrimination as a criterion for expropriation and, signifi cantly, a rather 
more express and generic ‘without prejudice’ reference to the effect of contrac-
tual undertakings. Also missing was any explicit reference to the effect of 
so-called stabilization clauses in economic development agreements. Of course, 
some still remained concerned at the precise balance; ‘[t]he emphasis illus-
trated by the wording of Principle 5.5 is too much on control’.35 And on the 
issue of compensation, views continued to differ as to what precisely ‘appro-
priate’ truly did mean – was it what is just and reasonable, or did the Hull 
formula (‘adequate, effective, and prompt payment’) still take precedence? 
Nevertheless, most speakers recognised what one speaker called the ‘welcome 
improvements … over earlier versions’.36 Signifi cantly, and this point should 
not be lost in highlighting such divergences between the participants, a broad-
based consensus was reached that traversed North-South (capital-exporting and 
32.  Para. 5.4.
33.  ILA, supra n. 2, at p. 465.
34.  Ibid., at p. 469.
35.  Ibid., at p. 480.
36.  Ibid., at p. 477.
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capital-importing) opinion. True, most of the voices were academic, thus not 
as tied to the political realities as governments within intergovernmental fora, 
but nevertheless it showed that the rules relating to expropriation could be of 
universal application, and were thus not necessarily a partisan tool. And though 
it is also true that on numerous contentious aspects the matter was, at best, 
deferred – thus suggesting less than true universality of agreement on the topic 
– what was achieved, and the fact that all were able to ‘sign up’, was still of real 
signifi cance.
 The second principle which generated much discussion was the right to 
development, which was simultaneously being discussed within the United 
Nations as a prelude to its adoption in December 1986 as the UN Declaration 
on the Right to Development. The fi nal text of the Declaration on this point is 
instructive:
‘6.1 The right to development is a principle of public international law in general and 
of human rights law in particular, and is based on the right of self-determination of 
peoples.
6.2 By virtue of the right to development as a principle of human rights law, indi-
viduals and peoples are entitled to the results of the efforts of States … in order to 
achieve a proper social and international order for the implementation of the human 
rights … through a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process 
based upon their free and active participation.
6.3 The right to development as a principle of public international law implies the co-
operation of States for the elaboration of civil, cultural, political and social standards 
… These standards should be taken into account by States in the formulation, adop-
tion and implementation of administrative, legislative, policy and other measures for 
the realization of the right to development at both national and international levels.’
The draft of this text was very much based on work undertaken within the 
Commission on Human Rights, with members of the ILA Committee also 
actively involved in the preparation of the UNDRD. Thus, the inclusion of a 
right to development in the Seoul Declaration was seen by many as a sine qua 
non. During the Seoul working sessions however, others – particularly speakers 
from the North – were less convinced. As a good example of this scepticism, 
still held today by some, one might quote from a speaker from the United 
Kingdom, ‘[t]here is also undoubtedly a diffi culty … about the description of 
it as “a human right” – or even, I think, in the terminology of the new amended 
version, as a “principle of human rights law” – and the potential effects which 
this assimilation has for human rights in the classic sense’.37 Such a view, 
though supported by some (another participant questioned whether such a right 
was ‘juridically sound’), was nevertheless in a minority. Most were able to 
accept – if somewhat grudgingly – the fi nal wording, refl ecting as close to a 
37.  Idem.
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compromise as was going to be possible on a newly emerging strand of human 
rights. What the fi nal wording does suggest, perhaps, is that the initial desire to 
provide clear divisions between lex lata and principles and rules de lege ferenda 
was not always easy, even with the best intentions. And as will be noted in the 
next section, this lack of fi rmness in the language used has perhaps refl ected a 
rather soft law approach to the issue of the right to development subsequently. 
 Though these principles were the most contentious, it would be amiss not to 
mention the signifi cance of the others, as the Declaration sought to be read – 
and should be read – as a whole. Though the Declaration makes many pertinent 
points (ranging from trade liberalization through to equitable participation in 
international economic decision-making), four of the more general principles 
are briefl y mentioned here, if just to highlight the broader parameters of the 
debate, as well as what – in its view – the NIEO should be aspiring to achieve. 
First, the advancement of the rule of public international law in international 
economic relations (principle 1), including the instruction that ‘States have 
a duty to abstain from measures of economic policy, incompatible with their 
international obligations’. Second, the principle of equity (fi rst part of principle 
3), namely that ‘development should aim at a just balance between converging 
and diverging interests and in particular between the interests of developed and 
developing countries’. Third, the principle of solidarity (second part of principle 
3), namely ‘[i]n the legitimate exercise of their economic sovereignty, [States, 
whose economies have the most global impact] should seek to avoid any 
measure which causes substantial injury to other States’. And fi nally, fourth, the 
principle of cooperation for global development (principle 4), which ‘implies 
the progressive development of this duty in proportion to the growing economic 
interdependence between States … with a view to a coherent implementation 
of a new international economic order’. As the fi nal section of this article will 
highlight, these and many of the other principles have struggled to fi nd expres-
sion in the global economy post-1986.
 Two fi nal points on the text as a whole may be made. First, some remained 
troubled by the continuing focus on juridical principle, rather than practical 
devices by which development and economic growth might be promoted. As 
one speaker at the Seoul working session noted, ‘the grave problems facing the 
developing countries and the international economic order require remedies that 
go beyond the formulation of abstract principles’.38 Second, though there was 
a range of specifi c issues that some felt should have been included in the fi nal 
text that were not there (i.e., rules restricting the subsidization of agricultural 
exports),39 there was a more general criticism amongst some that the Declaration 
failed to express – at least suffi ciently clearly – the contribution that economic 
wealth makes towards global development. As one speaker commented, ‘[t]he 
38.  Ibid., at p. 475.
39.  Others rejected such an approach, highlighting the general nature of the principles includ-
ed (ibid., at p. 484).
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positive role of private property in economic development cannot be denied, 
and should fi nd an appropriate expression in the Draft Declaration’.40 Though 
the Seoul Declaration could never be described as refl ecting an ideological 
mistrust of the private ownership of wealth – a criticism, rightly or wrongly, 
levelled at previous inter-governmental attempts in this area – nevertheless, 
the absence of an affi rmative right to property does now make the text appear 
somewhat asymmetrical.
4. SINCE SEOUL – THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND GLOBAL 
 NORMS
It is almost unnecessary to say that the current global economic situation is very 
different from that faced in 1974, even from that faced in 1986. The question 
then becomes how far do such economic and political changes justify an adjust-
ment to and/or rejection of the norms and principles of the NIEO, as contained 
in the Seoul Declaration? In particular, how far have such changes impacted 
upon those principles that were merely in statu nascendi in 1986? The aim of 
this section is fi rst, to outline briefl y some of these changes, second, to consider 
to what extent the Seoul principles remain relevant and third, to review the role 
and relevance of the principle of sustainable development within this wider 
debate.
 Unfortunately, one of the great diffi culties in making any form of solid judg-
ment about the current state of such rules and principles is the current lack of 
interest in the topic by the international community. Though matters of devel-
opment and global cooperation continue to form major planks of the policy 
and operational work of organisations such as the United Nations and the 
World Bank, they are rarely discussed these days in legal terms, and when such 
discussions do take place they are usually within a specifi c context rather than 
general international law. The topic of the international law of development has 
become both marginalised in light of emerging meta-disciplines, such as WTO 
or foreign investment law, and subsumed within the day-to-day workings of the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international 
organisations. Thus, international development law per se not only is consid-
ered a niche issue, only worthy of dwindling legal analysis, but its parameters 
– already subject to signifi cant inroads from supposedly ‘harder’ (i.e., more 
legal) disciplines – seemingly does not provide a suffi cient core of certainty to 
justify renewed political or legal interest.41 Commentators who once studied 
40.  Ibid., at p. 474.
41.  Bradlow, supra n. 14, at p. 217: ‘[I]t is safe to conclude that while the direction of the 
future evolution of IDL [international development law] is clear, and the scope of its content is 
discernible, the precise contours and content of IDL are very hard to defi ne and its evolution even 
harder to predict.’
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and researched matters of developmental law are increasingly few in number, 
in contrast to the over-abundance of voices on many of the legalistic – and 
commercially attractive – elements of world trade law, for instance.
 Nevertheless, some attempt may still be made to map out the current state 
of the rules and principles contained in the Seoul Declaration. As noted at the 
beginning of section 2, a range of political, economic and social forces have 
changed dramatically the global economic situation. Depressions, up-turns, 
debt crises, monetarism, regionalism, the rise of global currency trading, severe 
currency fl uctuations, the advent of globalization have all featured heavily 
in the past twenty years. Along with, and in light of, these phenomena, there 
have been numerous developments in the legal and policy sphere. It is beyond 
the capacity of this article to provide anything other than a mere overview of 
some of the more important changes, and there is certainly no scope here for a 
comprehensive account. However, the following developments – which have 
arisen either completely since 1986 or have become signifi cantly more promi-
nent since then – may be briefl y outlined.
4.1 A changed landscape?
Perhaps it has been on issues of global trade that the changes have been so 
obvious since 1986. The successful completion of the Uruguay Round, not only 
led to the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) but also codi-
fi ed – in binding forms – various disciplines that had either previously only been 
plurilateral in nature (i.e., technical barriers to trade) or had not previously been 
included within the international trade arena at all (i.e., intellectual property). 
Moreover, the agreement on a signifi cantly fi rmer dispute settlement system as 
part of the WTO, together with the newly established Appellate Body’s clear 
views on the importance of general international law in its deliberations,42 reaf-
fi rmed the role of legal norms in the settlement of trade disputes. Alongside 
these global changes, there were numerous regional developments, including 
the completion of the NAFTA negotiations in North America and the strength-
ening of other regional blocs. If, on the surface, such developments indicated 
the existence of a much stronger framework of regulation, nevertheless, as the 
current impasse in the Doha round of trade talks begun in 2001 has shown, 
strong legal rules do not, of themselves, create a positive legal environment 
for global development. On-going diffi culties in areas such as tariff peaks and 
tariff escalation, non-tariff barriers, agricultural subsidization, the over-use of 
safeguard clauses as well continuing problems of implementation of Uruguay 
obligations all point to a system that has now become what might be described 
as ‘legally-dense’ but politically-inchoate.
42.  For its earliest statement, see United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conven-
tional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body (AB-1996-1), 29 April 1996, p. 16.
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 Moreover, the ascendancy of public regulation of international trade, on the 
one hand, has been accompanied by signifi cant shifts – some would suggest 
downgrading – in the role and purpose of international commodity agreements, 
on the other. Though recent changes to such agreements have been heralded as 
a more holistic approach to all aspects of commodity trade, there is no doubt 
that the market intervention aspects of such agreements have been increasingly 
marginalised at the expense of a more rounded – some would argue ‘softer’ 
– focus upon wider developmental issues. Though these changes have been 
premised upon such notions as the integration of multiple objectives and the 
endorsement of sustainable development, which are, in and of themselves, 
undoubtedly positive ideas,43 producer-developing countries are now forced to 
face the stark realities of the effect of the global market with fewer guarantees. 
The safety net argument so strong in CERDS – and which fi nds some inclusion 
in the Seoul Declaration – has not been refl ected in practice in an increasingly 
fast-paced globalized world.
 Moving from the public regulation of international trade to the commercial 
sphere, multi-national corporations have become global players, with an infl u-
ence that could only be envisaged twenty years ago. Though now accepted 
by virtually all states as occupying a pivotal space in the global economy 
– emblematic of globalization itself44 – there are continuing diffi culties and 
disagreements over whether and how to regulate their affairs. As with the situ-
ation in 1986, there continues to be limited international supervision, and what 
there is is exclusively soft in character, accompanied by a patchy national regu-
latory framework.45 Though the international community has found ways to 
move beyond the failure of the draft UN Code of Conduct for Transnational 
Corporations, those divisions continue to permeate the broader debate.46 More-
over, though corporate social responsibility has become a necessary part of such 
corporations’ – and the global community’s – political and commercial mantra, 
implementation thereof remains decidedly variable in practice.
 Central to the ability of such corporations to operate successfully has been a 
dramatic freeing-up of national restriction on foreign inv estment, accompanied 
by a signifi cant increase in the use of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 
the development of new norms (such as ‘fair and equitable treatment’) that have 
43.  See French, supra n. 4, at p. 119: ‘Recent international commodity agreements have begun 
to recognise this link between such international trade and maintaining biodiversity.’
44.  See generally S. Hobe, ‘The Era of Globalization as a Challenge to International Law’,
40 Duquesne L Rev. (2002) p. 655.
45.  S. MacLeod, ‘Reconciling Regulatory Approaches to Corporate Social Responsibility: The 
European Union, OECD and United Nations Compared’, 13 European Public Law (2007) pp. 671-
702.
46.  See, in particular, the current debate surrounding the ‘Draft Norms on the responsibilities 
of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights’ originally 
drawn up by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (E/CN.4/
Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.1 (30 May 2003)).
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had a substantial effect on what host states may and may not do, together with 
the increased reliance on binding arbitration to determine the permissibility of 
governmental action and subsequent levels of compensation when that is found 
to be in the wrong.47 Of course, as with trade law, the existence of law does not 
per se guarantee either domestic development or fair distribution of benefi ts 
within a state.
 In addition to these matters, the World Bank – less so, perhaps, the IMF – 
has refocused and restructured its approach to development.48 The Washington 
Consensus – market liberalization, deregulation, privatization, cutting social 
spending – on which the 1980s was built, has been replaced, by and large, with 
a focus on poverty eradication and assisting developing countries themselves, 
together with their stakeholders, implement their ‘own’ national development 
programmes and poverty reduction plans. This has been further supported by 
international efforts – led by the Bretton Woods Institutions – to begin to tackle 
the grotesque levels of third world debt.49 Whether the reality of this change is 
as signifi cant as the rhetoric continues to be debated, though most are prepared 
to accept that changes over the last two decades at the World Bank, in partic-
ular, are more than just cosmetic; how much more, however, is contestable.
 Undoubtedly much of this institutional change has been prompted by 
greater consideration being given to various non-economic factors, including 
human rights, social development (life, water, food, habitation), environmental 
protection and the emergence of sustainable development as a global objec-
tive as means of integrating economic development, social development and 
environmental protection.50 The rise of specialist interest groups and active non-
governmental organizations with their consequent focus on substantive issues 
(such as those identifi ed above), constitutional matters of legitimacy, transpar-
ency, accountability and systemic topics of good governance, anti-corruption, 
debt relief and poverty eradication et cetera have also done much to broaden 
the debate. 
 Of particular relevance to this article is the emergence of the notion 
of sustainable development, specifi cally as a means to bridge the economic 
and non-economic discussion.51 As the International Court noted in Case 
Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) Request 
47.  On changes in foreign investment and the attendant regulatory environment, see M. Sor-
narajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 2004).
48.  See N. Bridgeman, ‘World Bank Reform in the Post-Policy Era’, 13 Georgetown Interna-
tional Environmental L Rev. (2001) p. 1013.
49.  Through the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and the enhanced-HIPC programmes.
50.  As reaffi rmed by the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation adopted at the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development in 2002, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20.
51.  For a general discussion of the emergence of sustainable development, see N. Schrijver 
and F. Weiss, eds., International Law and Sustainable Development: Principles and Practice (Lei-
den, Martinus Nijhoff 2004), M-C. Cordonier Segger and A. Khalfan, Sustainable Development 
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for the Indication of Provisional Measures (2006), ‘the present case highlights 
the importance of the need to ensure environmental protection of shared natural 
resources while allowing for sustainable economic development … account 
must be taken of the need to safeguard the continued conservation of the river 
environment and the rights of economic development of the riparian States’.52 
Moreover, the challenges that the international community face in promoting 
sustainable development are all inherently economic in one way or another. As 
the 2004 Declaration of Nuevo León makes clear,
‘[i]n the search for sustained and equitable economic growth that contributes to 
long-term development, reduces poverty, eliminates hunger, and raises the standard 
of living of the population, with special attention to the most vulnerable sectors and 
social groups, we commit to continue implementing sound macroeconomic policies, 
prudent fiscal and monetary policies, appropriate exchange rate regimes, prudent 
and appropriate public debt management, diversification of the economy, and the 
improvement of competitiveness.’53
Nevertheless, as section 4.3 will explore, the connexions between the NIEO and 
sustainable development – though both intuitive and foundational to a fairer and 
successful international system, are not without their complexities.
4.2 A continuing relevance for the Seoul principles?
These and many other changes are reshaping the economic – and the legal – 
landscape. But what does this – admittedly brief – review say about the rules 
and principles in the Seoul Declaration? The remainder of this article therefore 
seeks to make an assessment of this, grouping various of the cognate principles 
together. First, it is arguable that the rule of public international law in inter-
national economic relations (principle 1) has been strengthened since 1986; 
over 150 parties to the WTO, the exponential rise of BITs, the emergence of 
rule-based regional trading and investment agreements would all appear to be 
testament to the importance of legal norms within economic affairs. Neverthe-
less, it remains the case that some institutions (such as the IMF) still prefer to 
operate within the ‘grey’ sphere of legal norms and, much more worryingly, 
some states continue to act unilaterally – outside accepted parameters – when 
this is felt necessary in the economic fi eld. The persisting belief in the United 
States, in particular, as to the permissibility of wide-ranging extra-territorial 
(extra-national) legislative measures, particularly to achieve foreign policy 
Law: Principles, Practices and Prospects (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004) and French, 
 supra n. 4.
52.  Judgment of 13 July 2006, para. 80.
53.  Adopted at the 2004 Special Summit of the Americas, January 2004, available at <www.
summit-americas.org/SpecialSummit/Declarations/Declaration%20of%20Nuevo%20Leon%20
-%20fi nal.pdf>.
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objectives,54 remains a real risk to the authority of an international community 
built upon law. Moreover, some issues remain un- or under-regulated. Interna-
tional investment law continues to be a rag-bag of rules and arbitral decisions 
without global coherence and developed states, especially, remain extremely 
cautious about regulating the activities of transnational corporations, other 
than through promoting self-restraint or other non-coercive measures. Thus, 
to be truly comprehensive, the rule of public international law in international 
economic relations must not only work effectively in those areas in which it 
currently exists, but it must also be extended to signifi cantly more issues.55
 A related principle in the Seoul Declaration is pacta sunt servanda (principle 
2). As a general principle of law it, of course, underpins international law as a 
whole. However, though arguably a rule of jus cogens, it remains, in the fi eld 
of economic relations, in some instances, inchoate. Continuing problems in the 
implementation of various aspects of the multilateral trade agreements annexed 
to the 1994 WTO Agreement can unfortunately be pointed to as regrettable 
evidence of a blatant breach of this principle, as well as highlighting the often 
one-sided nature of trade commitments. Moreover, despite the serious nature of 
such a breach, developed states have sought as far as possible to avoid a strictly 
legal solution in favour of negotiation.56 And though some developing coun-
tries are no longer prepared to accept the old hegemony and have thus begun to 
use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism much more proactively to tackle 
these issues,57 other developing countries remain – not necessarily by their own 
54.  For an earlier discussion, see V. Lowe, ‘US Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: the Helms-Burton 
and D’Amato Acts’, 46 ICLQ (1997) p. 378.
55.  As regards what might be considered a related – generic – principle of international law 
in the Seoul Declaration (the peaceful settlement of disputes (principle 12)), the situation would 
appear to be generally positive; this including the establishment of a signifi cantly strengthened dis-
pute settlement mechanism within the WTO, more widespread acceptance of the value of interna-
tional arbitration in international investment disputes (both state-to-state and mixed), as well as the 
emergence of non-judicial mechanisms of dispute avoidance, including the Inspection Panel mech-
anism of the World Bank, in which those communities affected/likely to be affected by World 
Bank lending have a right to seek redress where the Bank fails to respect its own procedures. How-
ever, notwithstanding these and other developments, it may be worth reminding oneself about the 
continued lack of development in many other areas that the Seoul Declaration also highlighted; 
‘new arrangements of a similar kind … should be envisaged in … the fi elds of international mon-
etary, fi nancial and tax relations, transnational corporations and the natural environment’. Despite 
some innovation, especially in the area of international environmental law, there have, however, 
been very few other developments. If the existence of independent dispute settlement is a sign of 
a healthy and dynamic legal regime, international economic law remains, at best, a partial and in-
complete version of what it might otherwise be.
56.  Decision of 14 November 2001 on Implementation-related issues and concerns (WT/
MIN(01)/17), preamble: ‘Determined to take concrete action to address issues and concerns that 
have been raised by many developing-country members regarding the implementation of some 
WTO Agreements and Decisions …’
57.  See United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Report of the Appellate Body (AB-
2004-5), 3 March 2005 and United States – Domestic Support and Export Credit Guarantees for 
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choice – passive players in an organisation which they are formally equal part-
ners.
 Second, as regards the principles of equity and solidarity and the entitlement 
to development assistance (principle 3) and the duty to co-operate for global 
development (principle 4) these remain either de lege ferenda or ‘soft’ law at 
best. Though the rhetorical outcomes from the major United Nations social 
conferences on environment, human rights, women, et cetera all appear to be 
sensitive to the needs of developing countries, and to an equitable global system 
more generally, the political and economic reality over the last twenty years has 
ensured that many of these things remain aspirational in nature. In particular, 
though progress has been made on some issues (i.e., further regional coopera-
tion within the South being a reasonably good example),58 many other matters 
have either remained largely outside the legal sphere (i.e., the entitlement to 
developmental assistance) or the outcomes – as compared to the negotiating 
mandates – have continued to refl ect predominantly the needs and views of 
developed countries. 
 This is not to negate important developments in the policy and operational 
fi elds, most signifi cantly, at the present time, the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) as inspired by the General Assembly’s Millennium Declara-
tion, which many states and organisations are seeking to meet and build upon.59 
However, such targets remain decidedly soft and, though they have been 
adopted by virtually all global actors as key objectives, not only is there wide-
spread pessimism as to the long-term likelihood of success, but there are deeper 
questions as to how such objectives inter-relate not only with each other, but 
also with ‘binding’ legal obligations.60 This is a question that no one seems to 
want to answer. And this is arguably characteristic of everything that has been 
and will be said; though there are – important – developmental initiatives taking 
place, how they fi t into the greater whole remains vague. Even as regards those 
objectives as universally endorsed as the MDGs, the conceptual framework 
which underpins them is far from clear. And just with the non-implementation 
of the 1974 CERDS, developed states in particular have been very successful in 
removing any sense of legal obligation from such initiatives, this being made 
Agricultural Products (request for consultations received 11 July 2007), both complaints brought 
by Brazil.
58.  Regional economic groupings, such as ASEAN, CARICOM, the Andean Pact, the South-
ern African Development Community (SADC), continue to play – to a greater or lesser extent – an 
important role within the wider global system.
59.  An annual report seeks to monitor progress towards the attainment of the MDGs and ob-
stacles to their success (see <www.un.org/millenniumgoals>). 
60.  For instance, see The Programme of Work of the [Biodiversity] Convention and the Mil-
lennium Development Goals – Note by the Secretariat (UNEP/CBD/COP/7/20/Add.1, 30 Novem-
ber 2003), para. 37: ‘Achieving the Millennium Development Goals as such is not necessarily a 
threat to biodiversity, but the implementation of specifi c development activities may well be.’ 
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much easier by the fact that developing states have generally become much less 
militant on such matters in recent years.
 Third, on the principles that caused most discussion at Seoul, especially 
permanent sovereignty (principle 5) and the right to development (principle 6), 
the twenty years since Seoul has seen both movement and continuing debate. 
As regards permanent sovereignty, much that was contentious has now moved 
on, refl ecting largely a more general acceptance of foreign investment. Though 
there continue to be disputes over such matters as the exact level of compensa-
tion payable in the event of expropriation, this no longer excites as it once did. 
Direct expropriation (in the absence of ‘appropriate’ compensation) is increas-
ingly rare, though not completely unknown.61 The increasing use of BITs and 
regional agreements to regulate foreign investment is establishing agreed stan-
dards on what is and is not permissible, though whether this represents general 
custom is vehemently debated.62 What is presently divisive is the how far host 
states may ‘police’ their economy, whether for reasons of environmental protec-
tion or other reasons of social protection and development, without incurring 
challenges on the basis of either indirect expropriation and/or unfair treatment. 
Recent case-law has been unfortunately divided on this point.63 On perma-
nent sovereignty more generally,64 what was seen primarily as an exclusionary 
concept has now been imbued with a more positive slant, including the imposi-
tion of emerging duties in the fi eld of environmental protection.65
 As regards the right to development, though some work has been done within 
human rights bodies to develop it further, both as a discrete right within the 
Commission on Human Rights (now the Human Rights Council)66 and, more 
61.  See, for instance, S. Subedi, ‘The Challenge of Reconciling the Competing Principles 
within the Law of Foreign Investment with Special Reference to the Recent Trend in the Interpre-
tation of the Term “Expropriation”’, 40 International Lawyer (2006) p. 121. 
62.  Sornarajah, supra n. 47, at p. 328. 
63.  See H. Mann, ‘The Final Decision in Methanex v. United States: Some New Wine in Some 
New Bottles’ (IISD, 2005), available at <www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/commentary_methanex.pdf>.
64.  It is interesting to note that the International Court in Case Concerning Armed Activities 
on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) (Judgment of 19 De-
cember 2005) was not prepared to accept the argument that the principle of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources (which the Court had agreed was a principle of customary international law) 
was applicable in this particular context as ‘there is nothing in these General Assembly resolutions 
[namely UNGA resolution 1803 (XVII), the Declaration on the Establishment of a New Interna-
tional Economic Order (UNGA resolution 3201 (S.VI)) and the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States (UNGA resolution 3281 (XXIX)] which suggests that they are applicable to the 
specifi c situation of looting, pillage and exploitation of certain natural resources by members of 
the army of a State militarily intervening in another State’ (para. 244).
65.  Schrijver, supra n. 9, at p. 392: ‘Gradually, it has become recognized that, under inter-
national law, natural-resources management should no longer exclusively be within the domestic 
jurisdiction of individual States.’
66.  See Report of the high-level task force on the implementation of the right to development 
on its fourth session, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/WG.2/TF/2, 31 January 2008.
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implicitly, as an important background infl uence in the consideration of other 
rights, such as under the 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, most developed states seem prepared to allow it to remain inchoate 
and largely unimplemented, if they accept it at all. Principal discussion of the 
right has been reserved to ‘soft’ diplomatic negotiation at the major UN social 
conferences of the 1990s.67 Nevertheless, it is hoped that overtime – and despite 
continuing protestations by some – the Seoul Declaration will be proved correct 
in asserting that the right to development is both a ‘principle of public interna-
tional law in general and of human rights in particular’. Moreover, if the right 
to development qua human right is still subject to ongoing political debate, 
more has been done to refl ect the Seoul Declaration’s encouragement for the 
‘formulation, adoption and implementation of … measures for the realization 
of the right to development’. The elaboration of safeguard policies (such as on 
indigenous peoples) within the World Bank, the rhetoric of poverty reduction 
strategies within the IMF, the setting of targets such as MDGs, improvements in 
development funding and clarifi cation of the objectives of such developmental 
assistance68 may all be regarded as an attempt to mainstream such a ‘realiza-
tion’. This is not to try to suggest that all is positive – by no means – and there 
is little room for complacency (all the above examples have been subject to 
criticism to a greater or lesser extent), but nevertheless there continue to be 
attempts to operationalise such considerations.
 Fourth, are the related principles of equality and non-discrimination (prin-
ciple 8), participatory equality (principle 9) and substantive equality (principle 
10). These three principles were always the central modalities in achieving the 
NIEO, though – at the same time – its principal tension. It is a basic presump-
tion within the NIEO that to achieve a just outcome, states must be both treated 
equally and non-equally depending upon the precise circumstances. Whereas on 
some matters, formal equality is a prerequisite to attaining an equitable result, 
on other matters formal equality is, in fact, the obstacle to be overcome, and 
should be replaced with substantive equality. In the period since Seoul, progress 
in achieving these principles has been signifi cantly variable. And though there 
are things which might be noted on all three principles, it is on the principle 
of substantive equality that arguably the most can be said. Since Seoul, work 
67.  For instance, in the 1993 Vienna Declaration of Programme of Action on Human Rights 
(A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993), para. 10 (‘reaffi rms the right to development, as established in 
the Declaration on the Right to Development, as a universal and inalienable right and an integral 
part of fundamental human rights’).
68.  See, for example, the 2003 Rome Declaration on Harmonization (25 February 2003), the 
purpose of which is to ‘harmonize the operational policies, procedures, and practices of [multilat-
eral and bilateral development institutions and the IMF] with those of partner country systems to 
improve the effectiveness of development assistance, and thereby contribute to meeting the Millen-
nium Development Goals’ (para. 1), available at <www1.worldbank.org/harmonization/romehlf/
Documents/RomeDeclaration.pdf>.
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towards substantive equality has, despite the rhetoric,69 become very much a 
secondary objective, signifi cantly behind the push towards more market-ori-
entated goals. Though it is true that in many situations developing countries 
are still provided with certain exceptions and exemptions, the general thrust of 
developments since that time has been towards the elaboration of rules that are 
non-discriminatory, both in law and fact. The completion of the Uruguay trade 
round signalled a major shift in approach; though special and differential treat-
ment continued to exist across a spectrum of issues, often such differentiation 
was no longer absolute, but either time-limited or otherwise restricted. Preferen-
tial and non-reciprocal treatment, though it continues to be endorsed particularly 
for least developed countries, is increasingly subject to other, competing, pres-
sures which often minimise the full effect of such benefi ts. Probably the most 
contentious example is the implementation of the 1994 TRIPS Agreement on 
Intellectual Property Rights which, through its fi nite implementation periods 
and other limitations, has sought to create a global system of intellectual prop-
erty protection within a timeframe that largely ignores the substantially longer 
historical period in which developed countries were able to devise and shape 
their own systems in tune with their own priorities and values.70
 In a similar vein, much could be said on many of the remaining Seoul prin-
ciples. In particular, the imbalanced nature of current trade law also continues 
to be of signifi cant concern. Issues such as the continuation of tariff peaks and 
tariff escalation for semi-fi nished and fi nished products, agricultural subsidiza-
tion and other protective measures, and the increased use of non-tariff measures 
(sometimes now under the guise of environmental protectionism)71 continue to 
hurt the poorest the most. Though the announcement in 2001 of the start of the 
Doha Development round of trade talks was meant to refl ect the reality that the 
majority of the members of the WTO are developing countries, since then, the 
round has stalled amid the usual, and rather predictable, divisions on traditional 
issues. Debates over the international regulation of agriculture, in particular, 
69.  See WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001), para. 
44: ‘We reaffi rm that provisions for special and differential treatment are an integral part of the 
WTO Agreements … We therefore agree that all special and differential treatment provisions shall 
be reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and op-
erational.’
70.  For a summary discussion on the relative merits of IP protection in and for developing 
countries, see M. Matsushita, et al., The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and Policy, 2nd 
edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2006) pp. 709-711.
71.  For a relatively early instance of this concern, see the 1991 Beijing Declaration of De-
veloping Countries (INC Doc. GE. 91-704433, 24 June 1991), para. 6: ‘[E]nvironmental consid-
erations should not be used as an excuse for interference in the internal affairs of the developing 
countries, nor should these be used to introduce any forms of conditionality in aid or development 
fi nancing, or to impose trade barriers affecting the export and development efforts of the develop-
ing countries.’
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continue to act as a very accurate barometer as to the just – as compared to the 
legal – nature of international trade law.72 
4.3 The NIEO and sustainable development – a commitment to 
  social justice
Despite the generally negative prognosis of the above section – thus suggesting 
that most principles are best respected in the breach than the observance – all is 
not forgotten. Within the ILA itself, for instance, the 2002 New Delhi Declara-
tion of Principles of International Law relating to Sustainable Development 
expressly ‘reaffi rm[s]’ the Seoul Declaration;73 building upon its precepts of 
equity, solidarity and global co-operation, amongst other concepts. And for 
many, the NIEO is not just simply a historical antecedent to the current debate 
on sustainable development, but movement towards the NIEO is a prerequi-
site for the long-term achievement of sustainable development. Of particular 
relevance is the inclusion within the New Delhi Declaration of notions of inter-
generational equity and, especially, intragenerational equity, the latter being 
defi ned as ‘the right of all peoples within the current generation of fair access 
to the current generation’s entitlement to the Earth’s natural resources’74 – this 
corresponding very closely with many of the underlying assumptions in the 
Seoul Declaration. Moreover, the New Delhi Declaration – refl ecting changing 
political times – contains matters that would now be considered essential to the 
achievement of the NIEO; not only environmental conservation75 but also good 
governance,76 public participation,77 human rights,78 gender empowerment,79 
72.  See generally, M. Cardwell, C. Rodgers and M. Rosso Grossman, eds., Agriculture and 
International Trade: Law, Policy and the WTO (Wallingford, CABI Publishing 2003).
73.  See supra n. 4, preamble.
74.  Ibid., para. 2.1.
75.  Ibid., para. 1.2: ‘States are under a duty to manage natural resources, including natural 
resources within their own territory or jurisdiction, in a rational, sustainable and safe way so as to 
contribute to the development of their peoples, with particular regard for the rights of indigenous 
peoples, and to the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of the 
environment, including ecosystems.’
76.  Ibid., para. 6.1: ‘The principle of good governance is essential to the progressive develop-
ment and codifi cation of international law relating to sustainable development.’
77.  Ibid., para. 5.1: ‘Public participation is essential to sustainable development and good gov-
ernance in that it is a condition for responsive, transparent and accountable governments as well a 
condition for the active engagement of equally responsive, transparent and accountable civil soci-
ety organizations, including industrial concerns and trade unions.’
78.  Ibid., para. 6.1(c): ‘… to respect the principle of due process in their procedures and to 
observe the rule of law and human rights’.
79.  Ibid., para. 5.1: ‘The vital role of women in sustainable development should be recog-
nized.’
boek_NILR2008-1.indb   27 25-4-2008   10:03:11
D. FRENCH28 NILR 2008
precautionary approach to human health and natural resources80 and poverty 
eradication81 to name but a few. All of these notions are, of course, legitimate 
in their own right as well as fully capable of being operationalised in isolation, 
but it is when they are understood within the broader framework of sustainable 
development – a principle that is now regularly fi nding judicial support82 – that 
the inter-connected nature of these issues becomes that much more apparent. 
 In his review of the Seoul Declaration, VerLoren van Themaat rightly 
identifi ed both these changing trends (‘[a]t the time of the preparation of the 
Seoul Declaration nobody would have dared to contemplate binding rules of 
public international law on this issue’)83 as well as pointing to the signifi cance 
of sustainable development, more generally: ‘The new concept of sustainable 
development is potentially the most fundamental legal principles on the correc-
tion of the role of market forces by measures of “positive integration” on a 
world-wide scale.’84 However, though the New Delhi Declaration rightly upheld 
the Seoul Declaration, and at a rhetorical level at least, sustainable develop-
ment and the legal principles underlying the NIEO clearly both complement 
and mutually reinforce one another, there are nevertheless genuine questions 
over how they inter-relate which, in turn, go to the heart as to what vision of a 
global economy do the Seoul and New Delhi Declarations envisage. VerLoren 
van Themaat viewed sustainable development as a ‘correct[ive]’ of the negative 
aspects of the market economy, but how might this occur and what does it say 
about the current system? 
 The central focus of international efforts to promote sustainable develop-
ment has largely been through international trade85 and, more recently, foreign 
80.  Ibid., para. 4.1: ‘A precautionary approach is central to sustainable development in that 
it commits States, international organizations and the civil society, particularly the scientifi c and 
business communities, to avoid human activity which may cause signifi cant harm to human health, 
natural resources or ecosystems, including in the light of scientifi c uncertainty.’
81.  Ibid., para. 2.4.
82.  See, for instance, n. 52 and United States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products (Shrimp-Turtle I) (WT/DS58/AB/R) (1998), para. 153: ‘We note once more that 
this language demonstrates a recognition by WTO negotiators that optimal use of the world’s re-
sources should be made in accordance with the objective of sustainable development. As this pre-
ambular language refl ects the intentions of negotiators of the WTO Agreement, we believe it must 
add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the agreements annexed to the WTO Agree-
ment, in this case, the GATT 1994.’ Cf., Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine Railway (Belgium/
The Netherlands) (2005): ‘There is considerable debate as to what, within the fi eld of environment 
law, constitutes “rules” or “principles”; what is “soft law”; and which environment treaty law or 
principles have contributed to the development of customary international law … The emerging 
principles, whatever their current status, make reference to conservation, management, notions of 
prevention and of sustainable development, and protection for future generations’ (Award of 24 
May 2005, para. 58).
83.  VerLoren van Themaat, supra n. 3, at p. 23.
84.  Ibid., at p. 21.
85.  Agenda 21, para. 2.5: ‘An open, equitable, secure, non-discriminatory and predictable 
multilateral trading system that is consistent with the goals of sustainable development and leads 
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direct investment.86 As with the underlying ethos of the World Commission’s 
1987 report, Our Common Future, which initiated the current sustainable 
development debate, Agenda 21 does not directly challenge the primacy of the 
market paradigm, but sees sustainable development as working within it.87 In 
fact, whether it is examining diffi culties in the commodity sector, encouraging 
regional cooperation, promoting market access or further trade liberalisation, 
or strengthening aspects of international economic governance, sustainable 
development is seen, in many respects, as a natural corollary to simply a more 
effective international economy. As Agenda 21 notes, ‘inspired by the need to 
achieve a more effi cient and equitable world economy’.88 Whether, in fact, it is 
either conceptually or pragmatically possible to reconcile effi ciency and equity 
in this way is questionable; nevertheless, politically both notions are central to 
the intergovernmental ‘bargain’ over sustainable development.
 Though the 2002 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation seems, on an initial 
reading, more circumspect than Agenda 21 as regards the ability of the inter-
national economy to deliver sustainable development and other social goods 
– noting in passing the ‘serious challenges’ that globalisation presents, and the 
fact that ‘[g]lobalization should be fully inclusive and equitable’89 – the actual 
recommendations that it makes remain fi rmly entrenched in the status quo ante. 
This is, of course, hardly surprising; states, even developing states, are inher-
ently conservative and have become wary of radical change. 
 On the other hand, many commentators have sought to challenge this belief 
that sustainable development is achievable through the present economic 
system. As Khor summarises ‘[a] deep understanding of the conditions, and of 
the stages and levels of development, required for liberalization to have posi-
tive effects on sustainable development is urgently required. Correspondingly, 
when those conditions are not present, liberalization should not be pursued.’90 
However, the ‘offi cial’ agenda is very much premised on modifying what 
already exists rather than seeking to overthrow the established order. 
 Moreover, as the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation makes plain, globali-
sation is not regarded as a policy choice but rather something of an inevitability 
that must be worked within.91 Though not immutable – states have themselves 
to the optimal distribution of global production in accordance with comparative advantage is of 
benefi t to all trading partners.’
86.  2002 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, supra n. 50, para. 84: ‘[Foreign investment 
should be facilitated] so as to support the sustainable development activities, including the devel-
opment of infrastructure, of developing countries, and enhance the benefi ts that developing coun-
tries can draw from foreign direct investment.’
87.  On this, see French, supra n. 4, at pp. 175 et seq.
88.  Agenda 21, para. 2.1. Emphasis added.
89.  2002 Plan of Implementation, supra n. 50, para. 47.
90.  Comments of M. Khor, in WTO Secretariat, ed., Trade, Development and the Environ-
ment (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 2000) p. 58.
91.  F. Weiss and P. De Waart, ‘An Introductory View’, in F. Weiss, E. Denters and P. de 
Waart, eds., International Economic Law with a Human Face (The Hague, Kluwer Law Interna-
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recognised that globalisation can be made ‘fully inclusive’ – the general direc-
tion in which the international economy is moving is unquestionable, and 
largely unquestioned. As the Plan of Implementation notes, the aim, rather, 
is to equip particularly developing states with ‘policies and measures at the 
national and international levels … to help them to respond effectively to those 
challenges and opportunities’.92 Whatever the merits of fundamental change – 
no one could really deny the apparent virtue in Gillespie’s comment that ‘[i]f 
international trade was based on the basic norms of social justice and environ-
mental sustainability … then it might, in certain instances, be quite benefi cial 
to forms of sustainable development’93 – sustainable development is ultimately 
constrained to operate within the confi nes of the pre-existing system. Neverthe-
less, and asserting more forcefully than perhaps Gillespie does the merits of 
free trade, one might suggest that though these ‘basic norms of social justice 
and environmental sustainability’ are accurately refl ected in the principles of 
both the Seoul and New Delhi Declarations, it is only when these texts are read 
conjunctively and in an integrated fashion94 do they provide a convincing and 
potentially effectual normative framework for change.
5. A CONCLUDING THOUGHT: THE NIEO IS DEAD! LONG 
 LIVE THE NIEO! 
The Seoul Declaration was a conscious attempt to transcend the more divisive 
North-South opinions, which characterised the UN General Assembly debates 
of the 1970s, particularly those surrounding the adoption of CERDS in 1974. 
However, though hard-fought, the Seoul Declaration achieved approval largely 
by being selective in what it included; in the fi nal analysis, contentious text 
was simply replaced with less contentious text, but that does not, of course, 
equate with full unanimity on all issues. As section 3 noted, matters such as 
tional 1998) p. 4: ‘The ongoing integration of the world economy, popularly described as “glo-
balization”, constitutes a comprehensive challenge to established principles of ordering life in 
economically and legally distinct territories.’
92.  2002 Plan of Implementation, supra n. 50, para. 47.
93.  A. Gillespie, The Illusion of Progress: Unsustainable Development in International Law 
and Policy (London, Earthscan 2001) p. 96.
94.  For a thorough discussion of the principle of integration within the context of sustaina-
ble development, see the second report of the ILA International Committee on International Law 
on Sustainable Development in ILA, Report of the Seventy-Second Conference (Toronto, 2006) 
(London, ILA 2006) pp. 467-513. Integration is, however, no utopian solution; as the report notes, 
‘concurrent attainment of both human development and environmental protection is often diffi -
cult to achieve fully other than at the level of rhetoric. Real life situations almost always involve 
trade-offs; the best that one can hope for … is to mitigate, as far as possible, the consequences. 
Nevertheless, for many, if sustainable development is to be different from the status quo, it should 
require us to aspire to a macro vision of development that attains, at all times, the highest levels 
possible in environmental quality and human development’ (pp. 473-474).
boek_NILR2008-1.indb   30 25-4-2008   10:03:11
CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF THE SEOUL DECLARATION 31NILR 2008
permanent sovereignty (especially expropriation) and the right to development 
were amongst the issues that continued to generate debate right up to, and after, 
the Declaration’s adoption. Since this time, the global economy has changed 
in some hugely signifi cant – and unexpected – ways; such changes inevitably 
leading to the suggestion that this must invariably impact upon the relevance 
and applicability of the rules and principles related to the achievement of the 
NIEO. However, as recently as 2002, the ILA reaffi rmed the importance of the 
Seoul Declaration in the preamble to its New Delhi Declaration on Sustainable 
Development. Thus, the question must surely be, what now for Seoul?
 This article has sought to argue that whilst the global situation has changed, 
potentially affecting the political acceptability of some of the norms, they 
nevertheless remain extremely pertinent. Though the more extreme and partisan 
versions of the NIEO (including various aspects of CERDS) must now be 
considered largely of historical interest only, the underlying purposes that lie 
behind the ideal are still worth pursuing. And as an attempt to achieve a broad-
span of opinion across a range of geo-political and legal jurisdictions, the 1986 
Seoul Declaration must be considered a pivotal starting point. Of course, one 
might always suggest changes to the wording or the addition of new principles. 
As noted above, a revised declaration might incorporate and/or increase refer-
ences to issues of good governance, human rights, sustainable development, 
poverty eradication, the range of international actors now involved, together 
with emphasis upon the current role of capital markets in the global economy 
and a more balanced view of both the positive aspects of economic growth and 
private wealth alongside recognition that these benefi ts are not evenly distrib-
uted. However, to the extent that most of these issues are either now refl ected 
in the ILA’s New Delhi Declaration or can be interpreted as falling within more 
general principles,95 any attempt at rewording would be nothing more than a 
distraction. 
 But what of the dual nature of the Seoul Declaration; both declaratory of 
existing law and refl ective of more progressive rules and principles? What this 
article has sought to show is that it is not just a case of an overly simplistic 
divide between what is law and what is not, but between what is accepted and 
thus has been implemented and what is not. This leads to two conclusions, 
which on fi rst impressions would seem to be contradictory. First, attaining legal 
status for de lege ferenda and principles in statu nascendi does not, in itself, 
guarantee their acceptance and implementation. Second, legal status is not 
required to achieve positive outcomes, so long as there is the necessary political 
will. For instance, if successful, the MDGs would achieve much more than any 
abstract legal principle ever could. Of course, political will and legal acceptance 
95.  For instance, the desire to regulate capital markets so as to ensure a balanced and stable 
world economy could be argued as falling within the principle of global solidarity (‘[i]n the legiti-
mate exercise of their economic sovereignty, [States, whose economies have the most global im-
pact] should seek to avoid any measure which causes substantial injury to other States’ (para. 3.2).
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are often the same thing; nevertheless they are distinct. And as noted above, 
what is required is not just that principles that are currently de lege ferenda be 
‘converted’ into hard law, but as important, that there is political acceptance 
of – as a precursor to political movement towards – the fulfi lment of legally 
binding rules and principles.
 Some would thus suggest that achieving the NIEO is like searching for 
Nirvana or spiritual enlightenment, however hard the striving, reaching the 
end-point is never fully possible. As Koskenniemi remarks about interna-
tional law generally, ‘[t]here is a Messianic structure to international law, the 
announcement of something that remains eternally postponed’.96 There may 
be some truth in this, however in this context, it can also be a useful excuse 
on the part of developed states, in particular, to resist fundamental and struc-
tural change. A sounder argument is to consider documents such as the Seoul 
and the New Delhi Declarations as containing useful pointers – if not, in some 
instances, also measurable signposts – towards the achievement of longer-term 
goals, in this case arriving ‘at a just balance between converging and diverging 
interests and in particular between the interests of developed and developing 
countries’,97 which must be considered foundational to the functioning not only 
of an equitable economic system but also, in the light of changing expectations, 
a sustainable international community, more generally. But being longer-term 
makes such objectives no less important. If anything, what the past twenty 
years has shown is that taking action towards establishing a new international 
economic order is now even more important than ever even if, concurrently, it 
is now likely to be more diffi cult to implement than it would have been back in 
1986. But, as VerLoren van Themaat, noted in his ten year review of the Seoul 
Declaration, ‘one must conclude that it is very diffi cult and in any case will take 
far more time to change the course of the powerful ship of sustained quantitative 
economic growth, supported as it is by free trade, towards the target of a quali-
tative development designed to enhance “the productivity of natural resources 
within the social and ecological context”’.98
96.  M. Koskenniemi, ‘What is International Law for?’, in M. Evans, ed., International Law, 
2nd edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2006) p. 78.
97.  Seoul Declaration, para. 3.1.
98.  VerLoren van Themaat, supra n. 3, at p. 23, partially quoting H.E. Daly.
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